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ABSTRACT. The paper investigates the reactive bargaining set, a solution con­
cept for TU-games introduced by Granot (1994), in economies in which agents 
exchange indivisible goods and one perfectly divisible good (money). Under the 
assumptions that the preferences of the agents are quasi-linear and the initial 
endowments satisfy the Total Abundance condition, which is an abundance con­
dition on the money supply, it is shown that the reactive bargaining set is non­
empty. Furthermore, we prove that, in an exchange economy, this bargaining set 
and the (strong) core coincide if and only if the reactive bargaining set and the 
core of the underlying TU-game coincide.
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Introduction
In the theory of transferable utility (TU) games several solution concepts can be found 
in the literature, which are based on the idea of certain bargaining possibilities of the 
players. The origin of this idea can be found in a paper by Aumann and Maschler 
(1964) in which they introduced several type of bargaining sets. One variant, which 
was explicitly studied in Davis and Maschler (1967) turned out to be the most funda­
mental. More recently, in 1994, Granot introduced the reactive bargaining set, which 
is a refinement of this ‘classic’ bargaining set (see also Granot and Maschler (1997)). 
These two bargaining sets have in common tha t player î  has to be able to counter 
an objection (if there is one) of player î. However, the difference between them  is 
in the amount of information player î  has about the objection of player î. In the 
bargaining set, player î  has to give the counter-objection after player î gives the com­
plete objection. But in the reactive bargaining set, player î  has already to  give the 
coalition he will use to counter before player î has to give the complete objection. So, 
only knowing tha t player î raises an objection against him, player î  has to give the 
coalition he will use to counter. Granot (1994) proved tha t the reactive bargaining 
set of a TU-game is non-empty, provided tha t the im putation set is non-empty.
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In this paper we extend the reactive bargaining set to exchange economies in which 
agents can buy and sell indivisible goods and in which all payments are made in 
units of one infinitely divisible good that, following standard use, is referred to as 
money. In these economies, which find their origins in Debreu (1959), we assume 
that agents have complete, transitive and continuous preferences on the set of con­
sumption bundles under the four additional assumptions th a t ‘more money is better 
than less money’, ‘large amounts of money can change preferences’, ‘the objects are 
desired’ and ‘the marginal utility for money is constant’. These preference relations 
can be represented by utility functions, which are quasi-linear in  money, i.e. the 
preferences of the agents can be represented by reservation values for subsets of the 
available indivisible goods.
As in the theory of TU-games the reactive bargaining set of an exchange economy 
contains the (strong) core whenever the latter is non-empty. Given an abundance con­
dition on the money supply, which is less demanding than  the abundance conditions 
tha t can be found in Bevia et al. (1999) or in Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997), we 
prove in section 2 tha t the reactive bargaining set is non-empty, even if the (strong) 
core is empty. However, in case of an exchange economy with more general utilities, 
i.e which do not satisfy the condition of constant marginal utility for money, the re­
active bargaining set may be empty, as we demonstrate by an example. Furthermore, 
it turns out tha t for a reallocation in the reactive bargaining set, each agent receives 
a bundle which he appreciates at least as much as his initial endowment. This result 
does not  longer hold for the ‘classic’ bargaining set of Aumann and Maschler (1964). 
By assigning to every exchange economy a non-negative superadditive TU-game, we 
prove in section 3 th a t the reactive bargaining set and the (strong) core of an econ­
omy coincide if and only if the reactive bargaining set and the core of this TU-game 
coincide. In the literature several classes of non-negative superadditive TU-games can 
be found for which the reactive bargaining set and the core coincide (see Solymosi 
(1999) for an overview). In section 3 we prove tha t every non-negative superadditive 
TU-game gives rise to an exchange economy, and therefore each of these classes of 
TU-games generates exchange economies for which the reactive bargaining set and 
the core coincide.
Let us start, by giving the exchange economies investigated in this paper along with 
same basic definitions and results.
1. P reliminaries
The exchange economies with indivisible goods and money E considered in this paper, 
have the following features:
•  There is a finite set of agents N , with n  := \N\ > 2,
•  There is a finite set of indivisible goods Q, with q := \Q\ > 1,
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•  Each agent i G N  has an initial endowment (A i , m i ), in which A i Ç Q denotes 
the set of indivisible goods initialy held by agent i and m i > 0 denotes the strictly 
positive amount of money agent i has in the beginning. We assume tha t {A i } ieN  
is a N -distribution of Q, i.e. A i =  Q and A i n  A j  =  0 whenever i =  j .  We 
allow, however, A i =  0 for some agents i G N ,
•  Each agent i G N  has a preference relation <i on the set 2Q x R+ which is assumed 
to satisfy the following conditions:
C i : <i is a complete, transitive binary relation on 2Q x R + ,
C 2 : for all consumption bundles ( B ,x )  and (C, y) with ( B ,x )  y i (C ,y) ,  there ex­
ists a positive number S such tha t (B, x  — S) y i (C , y) and (B, x) y i (C , y  +  S) 
(continuity in money  ),
C 3 : (B ,x )  y i (B ,y )  if x  > y, for all B  Ç Q (strict monotonicity in  m oney ),
C 4 : (B,  0) y i (0, 0) for all B  Ç Q (non-negative marginaal value in  goods),
C 5 : for all consumption bundles (B, x) and y G R+ with (B, x) y i (0, y), there ex­
ists a positive number A such tha t (B, x) <i (0, y+A ) (archimedean property),
C 6 : for all B  Ç Q and x  G R+ with (B,  0) ~ i (0, x) it holds tha t (B, d) ~ i (0, x+ d)  
for all d G R+ (marginal utility of money is constant).
The set of all preference relations satisfying the conditions C 1-C 6 is denoted by R . 
Conditions C3 states that ‘more money is better than less money’, condition C4 
states tha t ‘the indivisible goods are desired’, condition C5 states tha t ‘large amounts 
of money can change preferences’ and condition C6 states tha t ‘money can be used to 
transfer utility from one agent to another’, since the marginal utility of money does 
not depend on the agent nor its wealth. We start by proving tha t each preference 
relation < g R  can be presented by a quasi-linear utility function.
P ro p o s itio n  1.1. For each preference relation <G R  there exists a unique map
V  : 2q ^  R+ with the properties:
(i) V ( 0 ) = 0  (ii) ( B ,x )  ^  (C ,y)  i f  and only i f  V ( B ) + x < V ( C ) +  y. 
P ro o f:
We prove that,
For every B  Ç Q and every x  G R+ there exists exactly one real number
u B (x) G R+ such tha t (B, x) ~  (0, u B (x)).
Let B  Ç Q and x  G R+. Define, K  := {y G R+ \ ( B ,x )  < (0 ,y )}  and define 
G := {y G R+ \ ( B ,x )  y  (0 ,y)} .  Then K  is non-empty, according to  C5 and 0 g G 
according to C3 and C4. Moreover, both sets are closed according to C2 and by com­
pleteness of ^  we have K u G =  R+. Hence K n G  =  0.
If y1,y 2 G K n G , then (0,yi.) ~  ( B ,x )  ~  (0,y2). This yields, by transitivity of <, 
(0,y-\) ~  (0,y2). And therefore, by C3, we have th a t y1 =  y2. Hence, there exists an
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unique number y G R+ such tha t ( B ,x )  ■ -  (0,y).
Define V (B) := u B (0) for all B  Ç Q, then V  : 2Q ^  R+ is uniquely determined and 
V (0) =  0. Furthermore, by C6, we have tha t u B (x) =  u B (0 +  x) =  u B (0) +  x  for all 
B  Ç Q and x  G R+. Hence, u B (x) =  V (B) +  x  for all B  Ç Q and x  G R + . From 
this it immediately follows tha t the map V  : 2Q ^  R+ also satisfies property (ii) 
mentioned in the proposition. □
R em ark . Conversely, if < is a binary relation on 2Q x R+ tha t can be represented 
by the utility function, U ( B ,x )  := V (B) +  x, in which V  : 2Q ^  R+ with V (0) =  0, 
then < belongs to R . o
The values Vi G R+ are called the reservation values of agent i G N . Hence, an 
exchange economy E is characterized by the tuple {N, Q, (Ai , m ,, V,)ie N ).
D efin itio n . Let S  Ç N  be a coalition. A S-redistribution  is a set { B ,} ieS  with 
Ui£SB i =  U ^ s A i and B i n  B j  =  0 whenever i =  j . So, we allow B i =  0 for some 
agents i G S . Let { B ,} ieS  be a S -redistribution and x  G R+ such tha t ^ ieS x i =  
S ^ s  m i then the set { ( B i , x i )}ies  is called a S-reallocation. o
If { (Bi, x i ) }ieN  is a N -reallocation then a S-reallocation {(C i , y i )}ieS is called a 
weak improvement  upon { (B i , x i )} ieN if V (c ,) +  yi > Vi (B i ) +  x i for all i G S  
and V (Ci) +  yi > Vi(Bi)  +  x-t for at least one agent î G S. A S-reallocation 
{(C i , y i )} ie s  is called a strong improvement upon { (B i , x i )} ie N if Vi (Ci ) +  y , > 
Vi (B i ) +  x ,  for all i G S . As usual, a N -reallocation { (B i , x i )} ieN  is called Pareto 
efficient/weakly Pareto efficient if coalition N  has no weak im provement/strong im­
provement upon { (B i , x i )}ieN . A N -reallocation { (B i , x i )} ieN  is a strong core real­
location /core reallocation if no coalition S  has a weak im provement/strong improve­
ment upon { ( B i , x , )}i£N.
Given an exchange economy E we define a TU-game ( N ,v g ) with the value for coalition
S  Ç N  as follows,
v£ (S) := m a x ^  Vi (Ci ) \ {Ci } ieS  a S-redistribution},
ie s
i.e. the m axim um  social welfare in the sub-economy in which only the actions of 
agents in coalition S  are considered. Observe tha t the TU-game ( N ,v g ) is super­
additive, i.e. v£ (S  U T ) > v£ ( S ) +  v£ ( T ) whenever S  n  T  =  0. Furthermore, since 
Vi(C) > Vi(0) =  0 for all i G N  and C  Ç Q, it is also non-negative.
Next, we give an abundance condition on the money supply in the economy E , i.e. a 
condition on the amounts of money m i  initialy held by the agents i G N .
D efin itio n . An exchange economy E satisfies the Total Abundance (TA) condition 
if every coalition S  Ç N  has a S -redistribution {Ci } ieS  such that,
Y j V i ( C i )  =  v£ (S) and V, (C,) < V , ( A , ) +  m ,  for all i G S.
ie s
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Such a S-redistribution {Ci } ieS  is said to  satisfy the TA-condition fo r  coalition S .
o
R e m a rk . The TA-condition is a weaker form than abundance conditions tha t can 
be found in the literature, namely Vi (C) < Vi (A i ) +  m ,  or even Vi (C) < m ,  for all 
i G N  and C  Ç Q (see for instance Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) and Bevia et al. 
(1999)). o
L em m a 1.2. Let E be an exchange economy which satisfies the TA-condition. I f  
the N-reallocation { (B i , x i )} ieN is a core reallocation, then it is also a strong core 
reallocation.
P ro o f: Let {(B,, x i )} ieN  be a N -reallocation which is not element of the strong core, 
i.e. there exists a S-reallocation {(C i , y i )}ieS such that,
Vi (C,) +  y, > Vi (B ,)  +  x,  for all i G S,
Vî (Cî ) +  yi > Vi(Bi) +  x% for at least one î G S.
Let { C 'i} ie s  be a S -redistribution which satisfies the TA-condition for coalition S  and 
define, yi := V i(Q )  + Vi -  Vi(C') +  ^  £ i e S [Vi(C') -  ^ (Q ) ]  for all * G
Observe tha t Y I ieS yi =  E ie s  m ,  and V,(C') +  yi > Vi (C,) +  y, for all i G S. Fur­
thermore, we may assume th a t Vi (B i ) +  x, > V ,(A,) +  m ,  for all i G S.  Otherwise, 
the coalition {i} has a strong improvement. Therefore,
yi > Vi (B i)+ x i  — Vi(Ci) > Vi (Ai ) +  mi — V, (Ci) > 0 for all i G S, 
yi > Vi (Bi ) +  x i  — Vi (Ci) > Vi (Ai ) +  m i — V  (Ci) > 0.
Hence, there exists a S -reallocation {(C,, y'i)}ieS  which is a weak improvement upon 
{(B ,,  x ,)} ieN  such tha t yi > 0 for the agent î G S  with Vi (Ci) +  yi > Vi (Bi ) +  x i . By 
using the strict monotonicity and continuity in money, it is a straightforward exercise 
to transform this weak improvement { (C i ,y i )}ieS into a strong improvement upon 
{ ( B i , x i )}ieN . Hence, { (B i , x i )}ieN is also not contained in the core. □
So, for exchange economies which satisfy the TA-condition the difference between core 
and strong core disappears. We write C(E) for the set of (strong) core reallocations 
of such an economy E . However, for these economies the difference between Pareto 
efficiency and weak Pareto efficiency remains, as the following example demonstrates. 
We write P (E ) for the set of Pareto efficient N -reallocations.
E x am p le . Let E := {N ,Q , (A i , m i ,V i )ie N ) be an exchange economy with N  := 
{1, 2}, Q := {a , ß }, {(A, , m i )} ieN  := {(a, 1), (ß, 1)} and the reservation values V, 
for i =  1,2 given by,
a ß a ß
agent 1 7 8 15
agent 2 7 9 16
The economy E satisfies the TA-condition, since v g (12) =  V i(A i)+  V2(A2). However, 
the N -reallocation {(a, 2), (ß, 0)} is a weak improvement upon the N -reallocation
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{(ß, 1), (a , 1)}, but it cannot be transformed into a strong improvement. Hence, 
{(ß, 1), (a, 1)} G P (E ), but nevertheless it is weakly Pareto efficient. o
The following proposition illustrates th a t every core reallocation of an economy E , 
which satisfies the TA-condition, gives rise to a core element of the TU-game (N, vg ) 
and vice versa.
P ro p o s itio n  1.3. Let E be an exchange economy which satisfies the TA-condition.
(i) I f  {(B i, Xi)}ieW g C (E ), then (Vi (Bi ) + x i -  m i) iEN G C (vg),
(ii) I f  X  G C(vg), then there exists a N-redistribution { B i } ie N such that
{(Bi , X i +  m i — Vi (B i ))} iEN G C(E).
P ro o f: (i) Let { (B i , x i )} ieN G C(E) and define X i := Vi (B i ) +  x i — m i for all i G N . 
Suppose X (S) < vg ( S ) for some coalition S  Ç N  (observe tha t also S  =  N  may 
be one of the possibilities). Let {Ci } ieS  be a S -redistribution which satisfies the 
TA-condition for coalition S . Then,
J 3 [V i(Bi)+X i] =  X (S ) +  ^ 3 m i < vg (S ) + £ m i  =  ^ [ V i( C i ) + mi]
iES iES iES iES
So, for all i G S  there is a number yi G R such tha t Vi (Ci ) +  yi =  Vi (B i ) +  x i . Take 
i G S , then by the core-condition for coalition {i} we have,
Vi(Bi) +  Xi > V i ( A i ) + m i .
Therefore, yi =  Vi (Bi)  +  Xi — Vi (Ci) > Vi (Ai ) +  mi — Vi (Ci) > 0 for all i G S. 
Furthermore, ^ i£S y i < ^ S m i . Define e := £ ^ S [ m i — yi] > 0, then the S- 
reallocation {(Q , y* +  is a strong improvement upon {(B i, Xj)}j£Ar. Contra­
diction.
(ii) Let X  G C(vg). Take a N -redistribution { B i } ieN  which satisfies the TA-condition 
for coalition N  and define x i := X i +  m i — Vi (B i ) for all i G N . Observe that
Y  x i =  m i and x i > Vi(Ai ) +  m i — Vi (B i ) > 0 for all i G N .
ieN ieN
Suppose the coalition S  C N  has an improvement, i.e. there exists a S-reallocation 
{(C i , y i )} ieN  such that, V (C i ) +  y i > Vi (B i ) +  x i for all i G S. This means that 
Vi(Ci) +  yi > X i  +  mi  for all i G S. Because £ ieS yi = J2ieS mi, this yields, 
vg ( S ) > E  Vi (Ci) > X (S). But X  G C(vg ). Contradiction. □
ieS
So, if an economy E satisfies the TA-condition and the corresponding TU-game (N, vg ) 
is balanced, then the core C(E) is non-empty. In the next section, we give another 
set of N -reallocations which can been seen as a substitute of the core in the case the 
latter is empty, tha t is, the reactive bargaining set.
2. T he reactive bargaining set in economies
The reactive bargaining set is a solution concept for TU-games which was introduced 
by Granot (1994). It is a refinement of the bargaining set for TU-games introduced
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by Aumann and Maschler (1964) (see also Davis and Maschler (1967)). This solution 
concept can be extended to economies in an obvious way. To do so, we first need 
the definition of an objection and of a counter-objection. For all i =  j  G N  we write 
r i j  := { S  C N  | i G S  C N  \  j }.
D efin itio n . An objection of agent î against agent j  with respect to a N -realloca-tion 
{(B i, x i ) } iEN is pair (S, {(Ci , y i ) } ie S ) with S  G r  j  and {(Ci, y i)} ie S a S-reallocation 
su ch th a t Ui (Ci , y i ) > Ui (B i , x i ) for all i G S. o
Given an objection of agent î against agent j  we now can give the definition of a 
counter-objection.
D efin itio n . Given an objection (S, {(C i , y i )}i£S) of agent î against agent j  with 
respect to a N -reallocation { (B i , x i , a counter-objection of agent j  against agent 
î is a pair (T, { (D i , z i )}i£T) with T  G j  and { (D i , z i )} ieT  a T -reallocation such that,
Ui(Di,Zi) > U i(B i,x i)  for all i G T  \  S,
Ui(Di,Zi) > Ui(Ci,yi)  for all i G T  n  S.
An objection is called justified, if such a counter-objection does not exist. o
Now we can give the formal definition of the reactive bargaining set in an exchange 
economy E .
D efin itio n . Let E be an exchange economy. A Pareto efficient N -reallocation 
{ ( B i , x i )} ieN G P (E ) is an element of the reactive bargaining set M r (E) if for 
all agents î and j  there exists a coalition T  G j  such tha t for every objection 
(S, {(Ci, y i ) } iES ) of agent î against j  there exists a T -reallocation {(Di , z.i)}ieT  such 
tha t the pair (T, { (D i , Zi)}ieT) is a counter-objection. o
So, given tha t agent î raises an objection against agent j  , before knowing how the 
objection of agent î completely looks like, agent j  has to give the coalition he will use 
to counter this objection. Observe, th a t in this definition we included th a t in order 
for a N -reallocation to be in the reactive bargaining set, it should be Pareto efficient. 
If one would choose to leave out this assumption, then the initial endowments set 
{ (A i , m.i)}ieN  is clearly an element of the reactive bargaining set.
Observe tha t if a N -reallocation is contained in the core C (E) no agent can raise an 
objection and therefore C (E) Ç M r (E), whenever the core is non-empty. Next, we 
prove th a t for exchange economies satisfying the TA-condition the reactive bargaining 
set M r (E) is non-empty, even if the core is empty.
T h e o re m  2.1. Let E := (N ,Q ,  (A i , m i ,V i )ieN ) be an exchange economy which sat­
isfies the TA-condition, then M r (E) =  $.
P ro o f: Let E be an exchange economy which satisfies the TA-condition. The reactive 
bargaining set M r (vg) of the TU-game ( N ,v g ) is non-empty (Granot (1994)). Let 
X  G M r (vg) and take a N -redistribution { B i } ieN  which satisfies the TA-condition 
for coalition N . Define,
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x i := X i +  m i — Vi (B i ) for all i G N .
Observe tha t J2i£N x i =  J2i£N m i and because X i > vg (i) =  V (Ai ) for all i G N  
it follows tha t x i > 0 for all i G N . Hence, { (B i , x i is a N  -reallocation. It is
straightforward tha t this N -reallocation is Pareto efficient. Moreover, we prove that 
this N -reallocation is contained in the reactive bargaining set M r (E).
Take î =  j  G N . Because X  G M r (vg ) there exist a coalition T  G j  such tha t for 
every objection (S, Y ) from agent î against agent î  there exist a vector Z  G RT with 
Z ( T ) =  vg ( T ) such tha t ( T ,Z )  is a counter-objection.
Let (S\  { (C i , y i )} i£ S ) be an objection from agent î against agent j  with respect to the 
N -reallocation { (B i , x i . Define, Yi := Vi (Ci ) +  yi — m i for all i G S . Then,
Y (S) = ^ 2  Vi( C i ) + £  yi — £  m i  =  ] T  Vi(Ci) < vg ( S ).
iES iES iES iES
Furthermore,
Yi =  Vi(Ci) +  yi — mi > Vi (Bi)  +  xi — mi  =  X i  for all i G S.
So, (S, Y ) is an objection from player î against j  with respect to X  G M r (vg). Hence, 
there exists a vector Z  G RT such tha t ( T ,Z )  is a counter-objection. Take a T - 
redistribution {D i} ieT  which satisfies the TA-condition for coalition T  and define 
z i := Z i +  m i — Vi (Di ) for all i G T . Clearly, £ ^ T zi =  £ ^ T m i and because 
Z i > X i  > vg (i) =  Vi(Ai ) for all i G T  it follows tha t zi > 0 for all i G T . Furthermore,
Vi(Di) +  zi =  Zi  +  mi > Yi +  m i  =  Vi (Ci) +  yi for all i G T  n  S,
Vi(Di) +  zi =  Zi  +  mi > X i  +  m i  =  V i(B i) +  xi for all i G T  \  S.
Hence, the pair (T, { (D i , zi )}ie T ) is a counter-objection. □
In case of exchange economies in which the preference relations { ^ ^ ^  are repre­
sented by utility functions which are not quasi-linear, one still can define the reactive 
bargaining set. However, in this case it may be empty. o
E x am p le . Let N  := {1,2,3}, Q := { a i , a 2, a 3} , A i := { a i } and m i := 12 for 
i =  1, 2, 3. The utility functions Ui : 2Q x R+ ^  R are,
U \( B ,x )  := + x,
U2 {B,x) := 6-L ^ J  +  +  l)-x,
Us(B, x) := 5 -L ^ J  +  x.
We write |_«J for the integral part of a G R. Observe th a t each utility function satisfies 
the conditions C i-C 6, except the utility function U2 of agent 2, which does not satisfy 
condition C6.
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Suppose { (B i , x i )} ieN G M r (E). Since this N -reallocation is in particular Pareto 
efficient we may assume without loss of generality tha t B k =  Q for some agent k G N .
Claim: x i =  x j  > 12 fo r  the two remaining agents i , j  G N  \  {k}.
Proof: Suppose x i < 12. If x j  < x k, then x i +  x j  < 24 and it is easy to verify that 
the pair, ( { i , j } , { (0 ,x i +  e ) , ( {a i , a j }, 24 — x i — e)}), with e > 0 sufficiently small, 
is a justified objection of agent i against agent k. On the other hand, if x j  > x k, then 
similarly x i +  x k < 24 and the pair, ({i, k} , {(0, x i +  e ) , ( {a i , a k}, 24 — x i — e )}), 
with again e > 0 sufficiently small, is a justified objection of agent i against agent j . 
Both cases yield a contradiction.
Hence, x i , x j  > 12 and thus x k < 12. Suppose x j  > x i , then again the pair, ({i, k}, 
{(0, x i +  e ) , ( {a i , a k}, 24 — x i — e )}), with e > 0 sufficiently small, is a justified ob­
jection of agent i against agent j . Contradiction.
Because x i =  x j  > 12 and {(Bi , x . i is in particular Pareto efficient, it follows 
tha t k  = 1 ,  i.e. B 1 =  Q and thus x2 =  x 3 > 12.
For every e > 0 sufficiently small, agent 1 can raise an objection against agent 2 in 
which he offers agent 3 the bundle (0, 24 — x 1 — e) (and keeps the bundle ({ a1, a 2} ,x 1 +  
e) for himself). Agent 2 can raise an objection against agent 1 in which he offers agent
3 the bundle (0, 24 —jgj{x2 — 6)—e) (and keeps the bundle ({a2, « 3}, j ^ { x 2 — 6)+ e) for 
himself). There is a justified objection, unless [73(0,24 — x i)  =  t/3(0, 24 — y§y-(x2 — 6)). 
This yields,
2-x2 —  12 =  x 2 +  X 3  — 12 =  24 — x \  =  24 —  • (x2 —  6 ) .
Hence, x2 =  X3 =  1 4 ^  and thus x \  =  But in this case agent 3 can raise an
objection against agent 1  in which he offers agent 2 the bundle ( { a 2, « 3 } , 9 j |y  — e) 
with e > 0 sufficiently small. The best agent 1 can offer agent 2, in order to counter 
this objection, is the bundle (0 ,16y|j-). However,
[/2( { a 2, « 3 } , 9 j |y  -  e) =  6 +  y ^ - [9 {|y  -  e] >  16 j f j  =  t/2(0 , 16^ ) .
So, the objection is justified and thus M r (E) =  0. o
3. T he reactive  bargaining set and the core
In theorem 2.1 we proved th a t an im putation in the reactive bargaining set M r (vg) 
of the TU-game ( N ,v g ) gives rise to a N -reallocation in the reactive bargaining set 
of the exchange economy E . The converse of this statem ent is also true. To prove 
this, we first need the following lemma, which states tha t every N -reallocation in the 
reactive bargaining set is individual rational.
L em m a 3.1. Let E be an exchange economy which satisfies the TA-condition. I f  
{(B i, x i ) } i€N G M r  (E), then Vi(Bi) +  xi > Vi (Ai) +  m i fo r  all i G N .
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P ro o f: Let { ( B i , x i )} ieN G M r (E) and define the sets,
I  := {i G N  | Vi (Bi) +  xi < Vi(Ai) +  m i} ,
J  :=  { j  G N  1 Vj (B j ) + xj > Vj (Aj ) + mj } .
Suppose I  =  0. Because in particular { (B i , x i G P (E ) it follows tha t J  =  0. 
Take î G I , then agent î is able to raise an objection against every agent in J .
A coalition T  Ç N  \ {  î} can improve if there exists a T  -reallocation { (D i , z i )} ieT  such 
th a t Vi(Di ) +  zi > Vi (B i ) +  x i for all i G T.
Claim: I f  a coalition T  can improve, then J  Ç T .
Proof: Suppose J  Ç T  for some coalition T  Ç N  \  { î}. There exists a T -reallocation 
{ (D i , z i )} ieT  such th a t Vi (D i ) +  zi > Vi (B i ) +  x i for all i G T . Furthermore, 
Vi(Ai) +  mi > Vi (Bi) +  xi for all i G N  \  T  and V,(A,)  +  mi > Vi (Bi) +  xi for 
all i G I . Hence, the N -reallocation { (Ai , m i )ieN \ T , (Di , z i )ieT  } is a weak improve­
ment upon { (B i , x i )}i^N . Contradiction.
Because { (B i , x i )} ieN G M r (E) it follows tha t for every j  G J  there exists a coalition 
Tj G Vj, which can improve. Observe th a t if two disjoint coalitions T  and T '  can 
improve, then also the coalition T  U T ' can improve and thus, according to the claim, 
there exists an agent j  G J  \  (T  U T '). Hence, there exists a coalition Tj G Tj i and an 
agent j '  G J  \  Tj such tha t Tj n  Tj/ =  0. W ithout loss of generality we may assume 
th a t j  G T j / . We write T  := Tj and T ' :=  T j ' .
The utility levels (ui )ieTnT/ are called feasible if there exists a T -reallocation 
{ (D i ,z i ) } iET suchthat, Vi(Di)+zi > Ui for all i G T  n T  ' and Vi(D i)+zi > Vi (Bi)+xH 
for all i G T  or there exists a T  '-reallocation { (D ', z'i )} ieT/ such tha t V, (Di ) + z '  > u i 
for all i G T  n  T '  and Vi (D i) +  zi > Vi(B i ) +  x i for i G T ' .
Since the coalition T  and T ' are able to improve such feasible utility levels exist. Let 
(umax)i£TnT' be the feasible utility levels such that,
Say, these feasible utility levels (umax)i£TnT/ are realized by the T -reallocation
is an objection from agent î against agent j ' . Hence, there exists a T  '-reallocation 
{ (D i , z i )} ieT' such that,
u max > u, for all feasible utility levels ( u ) i eTnT'.
ieT nT ' ieT nT '
max for all i G T  n  T  ', 
for all i G T ' \  T.
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But this means tha t £  Vi (D'i ) + z '  > £  umax. Contradiction. □
ieTnT' ieTnT'
In the proof of lemma 3.1 we explicitly used the fact tha t in the reactive bargaining 
set the agent î  has to give the coalition T , which he will use to counter, in advance. It 
might be of interest to point out tha t the result of lemma 3.1 no longer holds in case 
of the ‘classic’ bargaining set M (E ), i.e. in case the objector has to give the complete 
objection before agent î  has to give this coalition T .
E x am p le . Let N  := { 1 , . . . ,  4}, Q := { a 1, . . . ,  a 4}, A ,  := {a ,} ,  m ,  := 7 for all i G N  
and the reservation values V, : 2Q ^  R for all i G N  given by,
) if IC I = 4 ,
V (C) :=  V (C) =   ^ 7 if ICI =  3 or (|C| =  2 and a i  G C ), 
i( ) : ( ) '  2 if IC I =  2 and a 1 G C,
) else.
Claim: {(0, 6i ) ,  (0, lO i), ({a2, a 3}, 3 |) ,  ({«i, a 4}, 8|) }  G M { £ ) .
Proof: The agents 2,3,4 are interchangeable and can be treated equally. Moreover, 
none of them  has a justified objection against agent 1, since V1(A1)+ m 1 > V1(B 1)+ x 1. 
It is left to  the reader to check th a t the agents 2,3,4 do not have justified objections 
against one and other.
Agent 1 can only raise an objection against an agent î  G {2, 3, 4} via S  =  N  \  î  . 
If (S, {(C i , y i )} ie s ) is an objection of agent 1 against agent î, then there exists an 
agent i G S  \  1 such tha t Vi(Ci) + yi < \  • [7 +  21 — 6^] =  1 0 |. Hence, the pair 
({r?}, {({a.i, «j}, 3 |) ,  (0, 10^)} is a counter-objection of agent j .  o
W ith lemma 3.1 we now can prove tha t every N -reallocation in the reactive bargaining 
set gives rise to an element in the reactive bargaining set in the corresponding TU- 
game.
P ro p o s itio n  3.2. Let E be an exchange economy which satisfies the TA-condition. 
If  { ( B i , x i ) }ieN G ^ ^ r  (E ), then (Vi (B i ) +  x i m i)ieN G ^ ^ r  (vg ) .
P ro o f: Let { (B i , x i )} ieN G M r (E) and define X ,  := Vi (B i ) +  x, — m ,  for all i G N . 
Then, by lemma 3.1, X ,  > Vi (A i ) =  vg (i) for all i G N .
Claim: X ( N ) =  vE ( N ).
Proof: Suppose £ ieN V,(B ,) < v g ( N ). Let {Ci } ieN  be a N -redistribution which 
satisfies the TA-condition for coalition N . Define for all i G N ,
ieN
Because V,(Bi)  +  x , > V ,(A,) +  m ,  for all i G N  it follows tha t y, > 0 for all i G N . 
Furthermore, ^ J2ieN iVi(Ci) Hence, the jV-reallocation {(Q , yi)}ieN
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is a strong improvement upon {(B ,, x i )}ieN . Contradiction.
Take î =  î  G N . Because {(B,, x ,)}ieN G M r (vg) there exist a coalition T  G j  such 
that for every objection (S, {(C i , y i )} ie s ) from agent î against agent î  there exist a 
T -reallocation {(D,, zi )} ieT  such th a t (T, {(D ,, z i )}ieT) is a counter-objection.
Let (S, Y ) be an objection from î against î  with respect to X . Take a S -redistribu-tion 
{Ci } ieS  which satisfies the TA-condition for coalition S  and define, 
y, := Y, — Vi(Ci) +  m ,  for all i G S.
Then £ ieS y, =  £ ieS m ,  and because Y  > X ,  > vg (i) for all i G S  it follows that 
y, > 0 and Vi(C , ) +  y, > V ,(B ,) +  x ,  for all i G S  and thus the pair (S, {(C,, y i ) } i e s ) 
is an objection from player î against î  with respect to {(B ,, x , )}ieN G M r (E). Hence, 
there exists a T -reallocation { (D i , z i )} ieT  such tha t (T, { (D i , z i )}ieT) is a counter­
objection. Define Z,  := Vi (Di ) +  z, — m ,  for all i G T . Clearly, Z ( T ) < v g (T ). 
Furthermore,
Z, =  V '(D,)  +  z, — m i > Vi(Ci) +  y, — m ,  =  Y for all i G T  n  S,
Z, =  V '(D,)  +  z, — m i > Vi(B ')  +  x ,  — m ,  =  X ,  for all i G T  \  S.
Hence, the pair (T, Z )  is a counter-objection. □
Combining the results of proposition 3.2 and proposition 1.3 with the proof of theorem
2.1 we obtain the following result.
C o ro lla ry  3.3. Let E := (N, Q, (A,, m ,, Vi )ie N ) be an exchange economy which sat­
isfies the TA-condition, then
M r (E) =  C(E) i f  and only i f  M r (vg) =  C(vg). □
In case of an exchange economy with four or less agents, the reactive bargaining set 
and the core coincide, whenever the latter is non-empty. The follows immediately by 
corollary 3.3 and the result by Solymosi (2002). Recall tha t an exchange economy E 
generates a (non-negative) superadditive TU-game (N, vg ) and since in the literature 
several classes of superadditive balanced TU-games can be found for which the core 
and the reactive bargaining set coincide (see Solymosi (1999) for an overview), it may 
be of interest to point out the fact tha t the converse is also true.
P ro p o s itio n  3.4. I f  (N, v) is a non-negative superadditive TU-game, then there ex­
ists an exchange economy E such that vg =  v.
P ro o f: Let (N, v ) be a superadditive TU-game, which is non-negative. Define, Q := 
{ a 1, . . . ,  a n } and A ,  := { a ,}  for all i G N . The amounts of money { m i } ieN  are not 
relevant. Furthermore, we define for all i G N  the reservation values V, : 2Q ^  R as 
follows,
V '(B) := v ( { j  G N  I a j  G B}) for all B  Ç Q.
We prove tha t v ( S ) =  vg (S) for all S  Ç N . Let S  Ç N , observe tha t any S- 
redistribution { B '} ieS  obeys,
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5 > i ( B i )  =  ] T  v({j G N  I a j  G B i})  < v(S) .
i e s  ie s
The last inequality follows from the superadditivity of (N, v). Hence, according to 
this inequality we have, vg ( S ) < v ( S ).
By giving all indivisible goods within the coalition S  Ç N  to exactly one agent, we 
also have th a t v g ( S ) > v ( S ) for all S  Ç N . □
Clearly, two different exchange economies may give the same non-negative superaddi­
tive TU-game. Even the number of indivisible goods, nor the initial endowments do 
not need to  be the same. Nevertheless, given a non-negative superadditive TU-game 
for which the reactive bargaining set and the core coincide, the same result holds for 
every exchange economy generated by this TU-game.
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